Appearances and Things in Themselves: Actuality and Identity

Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately w...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inKantian review Vol. 21; no. 2; pp. 283 - 292
Main Author Stang, Nicholas F.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.07.2016
Subjects
Allais, Lucy
Author Meets Critics
Identity
Numerical analysis
Transcendentalism
transcendental idealism
Allais
actuality
identity
phenomenalism
existence
experience
Kant
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances.
ISSN:1369-4154
2044-2394
DOI:10.1017/S1369415416000078