Revisiting plausible deniability

Despite its prominence as a tool of statecraft, covert action's defining characteristic - plausible deniability - remains a slippery concept. This article investigates the logics underlying the two main variants. The first ideal-type, the state model, captures efforts by states to disclaim spon...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of strategic studies Vol. 45; no. 4; pp. 511 - 533
Main Author Poznansky, Michael
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 07.06.2022
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Action
Blame
Chief executives
Cold War
Covert
covert action
Covert operations
Democracy
executives
intelligence
Norms
Plausible deniability
Secrecy
Sponsorship
Transparency
Variants
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Summary:Despite its prominence as a tool of statecraft, covert action's defining characteristic - plausible deniability - remains a slippery concept. This article investigates the logics underlying the two main variants. The first ideal-type, the state model, captures efforts by states to disclaim sponsorship of covert operations. The drivers of covert action are primarily international, the sources of exposure are many, and its relationship with democratic norms is harmonious. The second ideal-type, the executive model, describes efforts to shield chief executives from blame. The drivers of covert action are domestic, the sources of exposure are limited, and its relationship with democracy is conflictual.
ISSN:0140-2390
1743-937X
DOI:10.1080/01402390.2020.1734570