Costly information acquisition: The influence of stakeholder earnings

Information is often acquired within organizations that generate earnings for employees and stakeholders. In this paper we analyze the causal effects of inequality on information acquisition performance and vary the pay of agents relative to the earnings of passive stakeholders. Our experimental res...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economic psychology Vol. 90; p. 102504
Main Authors Heinrich, Timo, Arya, Bindu, Haering, Alexander, Horak, Sven
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.06.2022
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Summary:Information is often acquired within organizations that generate earnings for employees and stakeholders. In this paper we analyze the causal effects of inequality on information acquisition performance and vary the pay of agents relative to the earnings of passive stakeholders. Our experimental results reveal that disadvantageous inequality does not have a negative effect on agents’ performance.
ISSN:0167-4870
1872-7719
DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2022.102504