Geographic deregulation and banks’ cost of equity capital

•We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on banks’ cost of equity (COE) using .•Deregulation increases banks’ COE, primarily driven by active acquirers.•We identify higher risk-taking as an important channel for these findings.•The results support our new acquisitions–fragility view.•Robus...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of international money and finance Vol. 120; p. 102498
Main Authors Berger, Allen N., El Ghoul, Sadok, Guedhami, Omrane, Roman, Raluca A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Ltd 01.02.2022
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Summary:•We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on banks’ cost of equity (COE) using .•Deregulation increases banks’ COE, primarily driven by active acquirers.•We identify higher risk-taking as an important channel for these findings.•The results support our new acquisitions–fragility view.•Robust to instrumental variables, checking for secular trends, other explanations. We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on banks’ cost of equity (COE) using changes in interstate bank branching laws over the post–Riegle-Neal period (1994:Q4–2016:Q4). We find strong evidence that deregulation increases banks’ COE. This is driven primarily by active acquirers, rather than those subject to increased competition from these acquirers. We identify higher risk-taking as an important channel for these findings. The results support our new acquisitions–fragility view, rather than the traditional competition–fragility view. Results are robust to instrumental variables, accounting for secular trends, and alternative explanations.
ISSN:0261-5606
1873-0639
DOI:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102498