Comparison of competing supply chains with different structures under cap-and-trade regulation

To reduce carbon emissions, many countries and regions have implemented carbon cap-and-trade regulation. The main objective of this paper is to explore the economic and environmental impacts of carbon cap-and-trade regulation on two competing supply chains. This paper considers two cases: (i) in the...

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Published inR.A.I.R.O. Recherche opérationnelle Vol. 58; no. 2; pp. 1653 - 1680
Main Authors Chen, Yuyu, Bai, Qingguo, Xu, Jianteng
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Paris EDP Sciences 01.03.2024
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Summary:To reduce carbon emissions, many countries and regions have implemented carbon cap-and-trade regulation. The main objective of this paper is to explore the economic and environmental impacts of carbon cap-and-trade regulation on two competing supply chains. This paper considers two cases: (i) in the absence of cap-and-trade regulation and (ii) with carbon cap-and-trade regulation. For each case, there are three structures: centralized-centralized (C-C) structure, decentralized-decentralized (D-D) structure, and hybrid centralized-decentralized (C-D) structure. First, this paper analyzes the optimal pricing decisions of two competing supply chains for the two cases, and then explores the impacts of cap-and-trade regulation on the sale price, market demand, economy (include enterprise profits and consumer surplus), environment ( i.e ., carbon emission) and total social welfare. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the theoretical results. By comparing the two cases, the main conclusions are as follows: (i) cap-and-trade regulation leads to the increase of unit price and the decrease of the market demand, (ii) cap-and-trade regulation leads to the reduction of both carbon emission and the consumer surplus, (iii) the impacts of cap-and-trade regulation on the profit and social welfare depend on the carbon cap.
ISSN:0399-0559
2804-7303
1290-3868
DOI:10.1051/ro/2024040