Equilibrium contract strategies under asymmetric product substitutability

This paper investigates how asymmetric product substitutability affect the equilibrium contract choices as well as the performances of the supply chain players. We consider a market with two competing supply chains, including two competing manufacturers and two common retailers. Two frequently used...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMATEC Web of Conferences Vol. 100; p. 5071
Main Authors Li, Baixun, Nan, Yaru
Format Journal Article Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published Les Ulis EDP Sciences 01.01.2017
Subjects
Competition
game
Markets
Pricing policies
product substitutability
quantity-discount
Supply chains
wholesale-price contract
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Summary:This paper investigates how asymmetric product substitutability affect the equilibrium contract choices as well as the performances of the supply chain players. We consider a market with two competing supply chains, including two competing manufacturers and two common retailers. Two frequently used contracts: wholesale-price and quantity-discount are considered. We find that under whether the wholesale-price or quantity-discount contract can be chosen by manufacturers would depend on the degree of product substitutability.
ISSN:2261-236X
2274-7214
2261-236X
DOI:10.1051/matecconf/201710005071