Overtime! Rules and Incentives in the National Hockey League

We construct a simple 2-period game model to determine the effects of recent National Hockey League rule changes on team incentives to win. The effects differ depending on the relative quality of the contestants and whether the contestants compete in the same conference. The model predicts that the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of sports economics Vol. 6; no. 2; pp. 178 - 202
Main Authors Easton, Stephen T., Rockerbie, Duane W.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Thousand Oaks, CA SAGE Publications 01.05.2005
Subjects
revenue sharing
sports league
talent conjectures
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Summary:We construct a simple 2-period game model to determine the effects of recent National Hockey League rule changes on team incentives to win. The effects differ depending on the relative quality of the contestants and whether the contestants compete in the same conference. The model predicts that the average number of points during a season will rise, yet the average point differential among clubs within the same conference will fall. The model also predicts that the expected value of points per contest will be higher when playing nonconference opponents but lower when playing conference opponents. Because only a small percentage of contests are nonconference, we predict that more effort will be devoted to conference contests, particularly by lesser-talented clubs. The result is more competitive and exciting conference games requiring fewer overtime periods and potential ties. Empirical data support these hypotheses.
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ISSN:1527-0025
1552-7794
DOI:10.1177/1527002504264424