Correspondence: Debating China's Use of Overseas Ports

• Published in: International security Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 174 - 179
• Main Authors: Logan, David C., Watts, Robert C., Kardon, Isaac B., Leutert, Wendy
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: One Broadway, 12th Floor, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, USA MIT Press 01.01.2023; MIT Press Journals, The
• Subjects: Harbors; National security; Ports; War; CHINA
• ISSN: 0162-2889; 1531-4804
• DOI: 10.1162/isec_c_00455

To the Editors (David C. Logan and Robert C. Watts IV write): Isaac Kardon and Wendy Leutert argue that China's influence in overseas ports is a "consequential form of state power projection" (p. 10) and an "attractive alternative" (p. 43) to overseas bases (see: Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “Pier competitor: China’s power position in global ports,” International Security Volume 46, No. 4 (Spring 2022), pages 9-47). They compellingly document China's desire to support peacetime naval operations from People's Republic of China (PRC)-controlled commercial ports, but they overstate both China's "privileged access" (p. 10) to these ports and how the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has used them. Rather, we argue that access to foreign ports depends on host-nation permission (which is uncertain), and China has not demonstrated that these ports provide robust fleet support. These factors likely impose significant limits on the PLAN's ability to project power from PRC-controlled ports. Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert reply: We thank David Logan and Robert Watts for their correspondence and welcome the opportunity to further explain issues surrounding port facility access and use. We concur that host countries play an important role in determining how Chinese companies and PLAN utilize ports. We differ, however, on the nature and significance of the “privileged access” (p. 10) that overseas infrastructure assets owned and operated (p. 10n7) by Chinese arms afford the Chinese military.