Glitch epistemology and the question of (artificial) intelligence: Perceptions, encounters, subjectivities

Reflecting on Leszczynski and Elwood's theorization of glitch epistemology, this commentary argues for epistemological approaches to the question of (artificial) intelligence in geography focused around perceptions, encounters, and subjectivities. Such an approach denies technologies marketed a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inDialogues in human geography Vol. 12; no. 3; pp. 379 - 383
Main Author Lynch, Casey R.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England SAGE Publications 01.11.2022
Subjects
digital geographies
epistemology
subjectivity
Artificial intelligence
computational cities
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Summary:Reflecting on Leszczynski and Elwood's theorization of glitch epistemology, this commentary argues for epistemological approaches to the question of (artificial) intelligence in geography focused around perceptions, encounters, and subjectivities. Such an approach denies technologies marketed as AI or otherwise as ‘smart’ the ontological status ascribed to them, instead investigating how particular technologies may be perceived as intelligent within the context of contingent and situated encounters with always differentiated and differentiating subjects. Glitch and related epistemological approaches reorient attention to the uneven production of desire and expectations for particular kinds of technologies and create opportunities to radically reimagine our relationships to them.
ISSN:2043-8206
2043-8214
DOI:10.1177/20438206221102952