Towards A Logical Account of Epistemic Causality
Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much less attention. In this paper, we address this issue by incorp...
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Published in | Electronic proceedings in theoretical computer science Vol. 308; no. Proc. CREST 2019; pp. 1 - 16 |
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Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Open Publishing Association
31.10.2019
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Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much less attention. In this paper, we address this issue by incorporating an epistemic dimension to an existing formal model of causality. We define what it means for an agent to know the causes of an effect. Then using a counterexample, we prove that epistemic causality is a different notion from its objective counterpart. |
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ISSN: | 2075-2180 2075-2180 |
DOI: | 10.4204/EPTCS.308.1 |