Aristotle on the Archai of Practical Thought

• Published in: The Southern journal of philosophy Vol. 56; no. 4; pp. 448 - 468
• Main Author: Elliott, Jay R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Memphis Southern Journal of Philosophy 01.12.2018
• Subjects: Aristotle (384-322 BC); Cognition & reasoning; Debates; Intellectualism; Morality; Multiculturalism & pluralism; Psychology; Reasoning
• ISSN: 0038-4283; 2041-6962
• DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12309

Scholars have long debated how exactly Aristotle thinks that agents acquire the distinctive archai (“principles” or “starting‐points”) that govern their practical reasoning. The debate has traditionally been dominated by anti‐intellectualists, who hold that for Aristotle all agents acquire their archai solely through a process of habituation in the nonrational soul. Their traditional opponents, the intellectualists, focus their argument on the case of the virtuous person, arguing that in Aristotle’s view virtuous agents acquire their archai through a process of reasoning. I intervene in this debate in two main ways: first, I press a heretofore underappreciated objection against anti‐intellectualism, that it is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of akrasia; and second, I urge that all sides in the debate would benefit from more sustained attention to Aristotle’s nonvirtuous character types. In the final section, I suggest that proper consideration of the full breadth of Aristotle’s account of character points in the direction of a new approach that I call “character pluralism,” according to which Aristotle’s moral psychology does not involve a single conception of psychic structure or moral development that is equally applicable to all character types.