Managing Indian deterrence: pressures on credible minimum deterrence and nuclear policy options

• Published in: The Nonproliferation review Vol. 25; no. 5-6; pp. 419 - 436
• Main Authors: O'Donnell, Frank, Ghoshal, Debalina
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Abingdon Routledge 02.09.2018; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: Air force; Ambiguity; assured retaliation; ballistic-missile defense; credible minimum deterrence; Deterrence; Guided missiles; India; Military policy; no first use; Nuclear weapons; Policy making; Strikes; India
• ISSN: 1073-6700; 1746-1766
• DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1565187

India is developing new nuclear force options in response to what it perceives as a deteriorating strategic environment. New Delhi has historically adhered to the nuclear strategic concept of "credible minimum deterrence," defined as maintaining a small, survivable nuclear force at low readiness in peacetime, which poses a credible risk of nuclear retaliation to adversaries but does not guarantee it. However, India's stated commitment to credible minimum deterrence is currently challenged by four specific developments: the gradual weakening of elite support for India's no-first-use policy; the decision of its defense scientific agency to pressure policy makers by publicly announcing it can field tactical nuclear weapons; the shift of Indian Air Force planning toward potential counterforce strikes; and New Delhi's unclear intentions concerning ballistic-missile defense. This article concludes that India faces a choice between two distinct nuclear-policy pathways: retaining its adherence to credible minimum deterrence, or permitting increasing ambiguity surrounding its true nuclear doctrine and posture. The article evaluates these nuclear-policy options and concludes that credible minimum deterrence remains more consistent with Indian national-security and foreign-policy goals.