Election Cycles in European Public Procurement

We study the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union. Along the procurement process, we separately analyze contract notices, contract awards, and project completions. We point out how these steps differ in their potential to address specific voter types. We argue tha...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inFinanzarchiv Vol. 77; no. 4; pp. 376 - 407
Main Authors Heinemann, Friedrich, Havlik, Annika, Nover, Justus
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Tuebingen Mohr Siebeck 01.12.2021
Subjects
Awards
Budgets
Contracts
Developing countries
Elections
Expenditures
Government contracts
Government purchasing
LDCs
Notices
Political campaigns
Politics
Purchasing
Voters
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Summary:We study the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union. Along the procurement process, we separately analyze contract notices, contract awards, and project completions. We point out how these steps differ in their potential to address specific voter types. We argue that the award is particularly appealing for politicians. It allows them to please the award-winning firms' stakeholders and the spending decision becomes credible from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards. The effect in awards is stronger for certain sub-categories like education and more visible projects.
ISSN:0015-2218
1614-0974
DOI:10.1628/fa-2021-0021