Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief
A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence....
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| Published in | Social epistemology Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 93 - 103 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
London
Routledge
01.01.2006
New York Taylor & Francis Philaldelphia |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Abstract | A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion. |
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| AbstractList | A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant & assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion. References. Adapted from the source document. A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion. |
| Author | Aikin, Scott F. |
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| References | Brandom Robert (CIT0002) 1994 CIT0011 Habermas Jurgen (CIT0008) 1990 Colapeitro Vincent (CIT0003) 2000; 73 Grice Paul (CIT0007) 1989 Adler Johnathan (CIT0001) 2002 CIT0014 CIT0004 Misak Cheryl (CIT0010) 2000 Rorty Richard (CIT0012) 1997 CIT0006 Sellars Wilfrid (CIT0013) 1963 Davidson Donald (CIT0005) 1970 CIT0009 |
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| Snippet | A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this... A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant & assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric... |
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| SubjectTerms | Belief Beliefs Contrastive Statements Evidentialism Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language Philosophy Speech |
| Title | Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief |
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