Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief

A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence....

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inSocial epistemology Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 93 - 103
Main Author Aikin, Scott F.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 01.01.2006
New York Taylor & Francis
Philaldelphia
Subjects
Belief
Beliefs
Contrastive Statements
Evidentialism
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Speech
Belief
Affirmation
Sufficient Reason
Assertion
Norm
Set of articles
Speaker
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0269-1728
1464-5297
DOI:10.1080/02691720500512275