Do wholesale pricing strategies matter during asymmetric disruptions? A game theoretic analysis

• Published in: Journal of modelling in management Vol. 19; no. 3; pp. 717 - 749
• Main Authors: Raju, Sarin, T.M., Rofin, S., Pavan Kumar, Jacob, Jagan
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Bradford Emerald Publishing Limited 13.03.2024; Emerald Group Publishing Limited
• Subjects: Brand loyalty; Consumers; COVID-19; Manufacturers; Prices; Profits; Retail stores; Revenue sharing; Supply chains; United States > US; COVID-19; Lock-down; Wholesale price discrimination; Stackelberg game; Disruption; Dual-channel supply chain
• ISSN: 1746-5664; 1746-5664; 1746-5672
• DOI: 10.1108/JM2-12-2022-0289

Purpose In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions. Design/methodology/approach For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store. Findings By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP. Originality/value Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.