Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue

The role of patent pools—one-stop systems that gather patents from multiple patent holders and offer them to users as a package—is gaining research attention. To bolster the scarce stream of the literature that has addressed how a patent pool agent distributes royalty revenues among patent holders,...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSocial choice and welfare Vol. 63; no. 2; pp. 277 - 297
Main Authors Abe, Takaaki, Fukuda, Emiko, Muto, Shigeo
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.09.2024
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Agents
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Original Paper
Public Finance
Revenue
Royalties
Royalty
Rules
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
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Summary:The role of patent pools—one-stop systems that gather patents from multiple patent holders and offer them to users as a package—is gaining research attention. To bolster the scarce stream of the literature that has addressed how a patent pool agent distributes royalty revenues among patent holders, we conduct an axiomatic analysis of sharing rules for royalty revenue derived from patents managed by a patent pool agent. In our framework, the patent pool agent organizes the patents into some packages, which we call a package structure. By using the hypergraph formulation developed by van den Nouweland et al. (Int J Game Theory 20:255–268, 1992), we analyze sharing rules that consider the package structure. In our study, we propose a sharing rule and show that it is the unique rule that satisfies efficiency, fairness, and independence requirements. In addition, we analyze sharing rules that enable a patent pool agent to organize a revenue-maximizing and objection-free profile.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01532-3