Solipsism and the Solitary Language User

The other minds skeptic supposes there may be no minds other than his. The external world skeptic thinks there could be no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes his could be. In this p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical papers (Grahamstown) Vol. 36; no. 1; pp. 35 - 47
Main Author Goldstein, Irwin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Grahamstown Taylor & Francis Group 01.03.2007
Rhodes University
Subjects
General philosophy. Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy
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Summary:The other minds skeptic supposes there may be no minds other than his. The external world skeptic thinks there could be no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes his could be. In this paper I examine one argument some people think refutes solipsism. These people appeal to the Wittgenstein thesis that it is impossible for there to be a language only one person understands. I show people do not refute the skeptic with the Wittgensteinian, language-necessarily-is-shared principle.
ISSN:0556-8641
1996-8523
DOI:10.1080/05568640709485192