Domestic Political Problems and the Uneven Contenders Paradox

Extant research has not produced consistent findings on the relationship between domestic political problems and the use of force abroad. We argue that this ambiguity results from incomplete theorizing and flawed empirical tests. We advance the understanding of diversionary uses of force by highligh...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inForeign policy analysis Vol. 13; no. 4; pp. 876 - 893
Main Authors Crisher, Brian, Souva, Mark
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Oxford University Press 01.10.2017
Subjects
Ambiguity
Bias
Conflict
Diverters
Foreign policy
Hypotheses
Incentives
Political power
Politics
Power
Probability
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Summary:Extant research has not produced consistent findings on the relationship between domestic political problems and the use of force abroad. We argue that this ambiguity results from incomplete theorizing and flawed empirical tests. We advance the understanding of diversionary uses of force by highlighting the political bias that domestic problems create for a leader and how this political bias interacts with the power relationship between diverters and potential targets. This conceptual discussion clarifies the political incentives each actor has to engage in military conflict and leads to a novel hypothesis. For example, domestic problems increase the probability that a weak state will attack a strong state, but domestic problems will have little effect on changing the probability of conflict between strong and weak. Empirical tests of the hypotheses for the period 1946–2000 are consistent with the argument.
ISSN:1743-8586
1743-8594
DOI:10.1093/fpa/orw001