Unpacking a Charge of Emotional Irrationality: An Exploration of the Value of Anger in Thought

• Published in: Philosophical papers (Grahamstown) Vol. 51; no. 1; pp. 45 - 68
• Main Author: Carman, Mary
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Routledge 02.01.2022
• ISSN: 0556-8641; 1996-8523
• DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2021.1984981

Anger has potential epistemic value in the way that it can facilitate a process of our coming to have knowledge and understanding regarding the issue about which we are angry. The nature of anger, however, may nevertheless be such that it ultimately undermines this very process. Common non-philosophical complaints about anger, for instance, often target the angry person as being somehow irrational, where an unformulated assumption is that her anger undermines her capacity to rationally engage with the issue about which she is angry. Call this assumption the charge of emotional irrationality regarding anger. Such a charge is pernicious when levelled at the anger of those in positions of marginalisation or oppression, where it can threaten to silence voices on the very issue of the injustices that they face. In this paper I thus provide a much-needed interrogation of this charge. Firstly, and drawing on empirical literature on the effects of anger on decision-making, I flesh out the charge and why it poses a threat to how the epistemic value of anger has been defended. Secondly, I argue that the charge of emotional irrationality regarding anger can nevertheless be unwarranted, at least within a common context of political anger.