How we read Kant: an Empiricist and a Transcendental Reading of Kant’s Theory of Experience

• Published in: Philosophia (Ramat Gan) Vol. 45; no. 3; pp. 1331 - 1344
• Main Author: Soboleva, Maja
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.09.2017
• Subjects: Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science; Concept; Experience; Empiricist approach; Transcendental approach; Non-conceptualist reading; Conceptualist reading; Kant
• ISSN: 0048-3893; 1574-9274
• DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9878-0

The issue of the nature of cognitive experience has been a subject of lively debate in recent works on epistemology, and the philosophy of mind. During this debate, the relevance of Kant to contemporary theories of cognition has been re-discovered. However, participants in this debate disagree whether Kant was a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist, with regard to the character of intuitions. The central point of controversy concerns whether or not Kant’s sensible intuitions involve understanding and have a conceptual content. In this paper, I show that, despite their disagreements, both sides share a number of common presuppositions, which have determined a biased framework for the reading of Kant. My principal aim in this article is to reconcile the case for conceptualism with those interpretations which argue that intentionality and conceptuality can be separated. To achieve it, I present my own reconstruction of Kant’s theory of cognition, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B-version of the Transcendental Deduction, and offer a new interpretation of Kantian conceptualism.