Emotional clichés and authentic passions: A phenomenological revision of a cognitive theory of emotion

This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments,...

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Published inPhenomenology and the cognitive sciences Vol. 10; no. 1; pp. 45 - 65
Main Author Maclaren, Kym
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2011
Subjects
Cognitive Psychology
Education
Phenomenology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Phenomenology
Contitution
Subjectivity
Solomon
Emotion
Merleau-Ponty
Embodiment
Judgment
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ISSN1568-7759
1572-8676
DOI10.1007/s11097-010-9160-4

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Summary:This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call "emotional clichés," and not for authentic passions. In contrast with Solomon's account which conceives the subject as constituting, this account of emotion requires us to understand subjectivity as moved by meanings in the world, and as sometimes, in an authentic passion, dispossessed by those meanings.
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ISSN:1568-7759
1572-8676
DOI:10.1007/s11097-010-9160-4