The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Review of Austrian economics Vol. 15; no. 2-3; pp. 211 - 228
Main Author Lopez, Edward J
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer Nature B.V 2002
Subjects
Campaign contributions
Capital
Costs
Economic Theories
Economic theory
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship
Interest Groups
Investment
Legislators
Market Economy
Political behavior
Political Economy
Politics
Shadow prices
Studies
Voters
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Summary:This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
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ISSN:0889-3047
1573-7128
DOI:10.1023/a:1015770705872