Against epistemic accounts of luck
Abstract Epistemic accounts of luck define luck’s chanciness condition relative to a subject’s epistemic position. This could be put in terms of a subject’s evidence or knowledge about whether the event will occur. I argue that both versions of the epistemic account fail. In §2, I give two types of...
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| Published in | Analysis (Oxford) Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 474 - 482 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
UK
Oxford University Press
22.11.2023
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| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Abstract
Epistemic accounts of luck define luck’s chanciness condition relative to a subject’s epistemic position. This could be put in terms of a subject’s evidence or knowledge about whether the event will occur. I argue that both versions of the epistemic account fail. In §2, I give two types of counterexamples to the evidence-based approach. In §3, I argue—contrary to the knowledge-based view—that an event can be a matter of good or bad luck for a subject even if she knows that it will occur. In §4, I argue that epistemic accounts cannot explain some instances of constitutive luck. Because of these problems, luck’s chanciness condition cannot be adequately defined in epistemic terms. |
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| ISSN: | 0003-2638 1467-8284 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/analys/anad013 |