Sharing Nonconvex Costs

The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggre...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of global optimization Vol. 20; no. 3-4; p. 257
Main Authors Evstigneev, I V, Flam, S D
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Nature B.V 01.08.2001
Subjects
Cooperation
Cost control
Economics
Game theory
Games
Lagrange multiplier
Mathematical programming
Optimization
Production planning
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Summary:The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.
ISSN:0925-5001
1573-2916
DOI:10.1023/A:1017599310112