IV-Knowledge of Meaning

ABSTRACT The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub‐sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inProceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 75 - 94
Main Author Weiss, Bernhard
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2004
Aristotelian Society
Subjects
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Language
Semantics
Tacitus
Implicit
Information
Knowledge
Signification;Meaning
Speaker
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Summary:ABSTRACT The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub‐sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it is to be contrasted with tacit knowledge which refers to an information‐bearing state which, however, is not a genuine propositional attitude.1 I begin by defending the implicit knowledge conception of speakers’ knowledge of the meanings of words from a challenge articulated by Evans and then go on the offensive against positions which attempt to replace the notion of implicit knowledge in semantic theory by that of tacit knowledge.
Bibliography:ark:/67375/WNG-C2TW96F2-Q
ArticleID:PASH082
istex:6B07D6D6CA8172008EAEE8AE8BBB1D7223358FD2
However note that other writers don't make quite this use of the relevant terms and I haven't altered their words when I quote them.
Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London, on Monday, 8 December, 2003 at 4.15 p.m.
ISSN:0066-7374
1467-9264
DOI:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00082.x