The Dynamic Evolution Law of Coal Mine Workers’ Behavior Risk Based on Game Theory

• Published in: Sustainability Vol. 14; no. 7; p. 4015
• Main Authors: Lu, Jifeng, Liu, Weihua, Yu, Kai, Zhou, Lujie
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Basel MDPI AG 01.04.2022
• Subjects: Coal; Coal mines; Coal mining; Employees; Evolution; Game theory; Group dynamics; Investigations; Mining accidents & safety; Mining industry; Occupational safety; Questionnaires; Risk taking; Safety; Safety management; Statistical analysis; Symmetry
• ISSN: 2071-1050; 2071-1050
• DOI: 10.3390/su14074015

In the safety production system of coal mining enterprises, the income of workers affects the evolution of group behavior and then affects risky behaviors. Due to the nonlinearity and chaos of group behavior, its evolution is long and complex. This study investigated the dynamic evolution process of coal miners’ group behavior to explore the law of group safety behavior and effectively promoted the safety of group behavior. First, a questionnaire survey was conducted on the influencing factors of coal mine workers’ group safety behavior. Then, based on the results of the questionnaire, the coefficients of the influencing factors were obtained, and the game model was established. Finally, the game income was simulated and analyzed. The results showed that the income of workers was positively correlated with the safety of group behavior. Safety performance could effectively improve the level of group safety behavior. The safety management system of coal mining enterprises was further improved and expanded and was applied. The statistical analysis of the violations showed that the results of this study could be used to influence the risky group behavior of coal mine workers and improve the level of coal mine safety production.