The role of selective extinction in promoting cooperation in a many demes model
•Diffusion approximation captures evolutionary dynamics.,•Uniform extinction suppresses cooperation in structured populations.,•Targeted extinction can promote cooperation.,•Extinction rate’s impact depends on payoff asymmetry (T−R vs. P−S). This study investigates the evolution of cooperation in a...
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Published in | Journal of theoretical biology Vol. 613; p. 112212 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
England
Elsevier Ltd
07.10.2025
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | •Diffusion approximation captures evolutionary dynamics.,•Uniform extinction suppresses cooperation in structured populations.,•Targeted extinction can promote cooperation.,•Extinction rate’s impact depends on payoff asymmetry (T−R vs. P−S).
This study investigates the evolution of cooperation in a deme-structured population where individuals interact via the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Reproduction is payoff-dependent, and demes contribute to a global migrant pool proportionally to their fecundity. Deme extinction occurs with a baseline probability plus an additional probability term that is proportional to the fraction of defectors in the deme, modulated by a parameter α. Extinct demes are then repopulated from the migrant pool. A two-timescale analysis, valid in the limit of a large number of demes, reveals that the system’s evolutionary dynamics are well-approximated by a continuous-time diffusion process. Using this diffusion approximation, we show that uniform extinction (α=0) suppresses cooperation. However, extinction targeting defector-dominated demes can significantly promote cooperation, establishing critical thresholds of α that determine when cooperation dominates. The study further explores how varying extinction rates and reproductive dynamics impact cooperation’s persistence and evolutionary success in structured populations. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
ISSN: | 0022-5193 1095-8541 1095-8541 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jtbi.2025.112212 |