Metaethics and Nihilism in Reginster's The Affirmation of Life

• Published in: Journal of Nietzsche studies Vol. 43; no. 1; pp. 99 - 117
• Main Author: Hussain, Nadeem J. Z
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Penn State University Press 01.04.2012
• ISSN: 0968-8005; 1538-4594
• DOI: 10.5325/jnietstud.43.1.0099

Abstract Bernard Reginster, in his book The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, takes up the challenge of figuring out what Nietzsche might mean by nihilism and the revaluation of values. He argues that there is an alternative, normative subjectivist interpretation of Nietzsche's views on nihilism and revaluation that makes as much sense as—indeed, he often clearly leans toward thinking that it makes more sense than—a fictionalist reading of Nietzsche. I argue that his arguments do not succeed. Once we have looked carefully at the details of the positions and the arguments ascribed to Nietzsche, the fictionalist option is the more charitable interpretation of the texts. I focus on the metaethical issues that play a central role for Reginster in his articulation of Nietzsche's nihilism and Nietzsche's strategy for overcoming nihilism.