The real effects of disclosure regulation: Evidence from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure

• Published in: Journal of accounting and public policy Vol. 41; no. 6; p. 106995
• Main Authors: Bao, Dichu, Su, Lixin (Nancy), Zhang, Yong
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York Elsevier Inc 01.11.2022; Elsevier Sequoia S.A
• Subjects: Audit committees; Audits; Chief financial officers; Committees; Companies; Compensation; Disclosure; Financial statements; Job performance; Ownership; Regulation; Research design; Stockholders
• ISSN: 0278-4254; 1873-2070
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.106995

The 2006 SEC rule, by changing the definition of Named Executive Officers, mandates CFO compensation disclosure. Using this setting and a difference-in-differences research design, we study the real effects of CFO compensation disclosure regulation on CFO job performance. We hypothesize that the disclosure of CFO compensation information, by facilitating shareholder monitoring of the board in providing appropriate incentives to CFOs, leads to better CFO job performance in providing high-quality financial reports. The analyses support our prediction: the treatment firms, which start disclosing CFO compensation information under the 2006 rule, compared to the control firms, which already disclose CFO compensation before 2006, experience an improvement in CFO performance, as exhibited in decreases in accounting misstatements and unexplained audit fees. The results are more pronounced for firms with concentrated ownership, smaller compensation committees, and CFOs subject to weaker monitoring by audit committees. Overall, we provide evidence of a real effect resulting from mandatory CFO compensation disclosure.