Logical Constructivism, Modal Logic, and Metaphysics: A Reply to Professor Pruss' "Professor Lucas' Second Epistemic Way"

Knowledge of philosophy exists only to the extent that there are logics of metaphysics, logics of ethics and logics of epistemology. One thus commits the monologic fallacy by committing oneself to the position that there is only one correct logic. Applications of modal logics to metaphysics in order...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational journal for philosophy of religion Vol. 52; no. 3; pp. 143 - 157
Main Author Lucas, Billy Joe
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Heidelbergc Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.12.2002
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Christianity
Constructivism
Constructivist epistemology
Contemporary period
Epistemology
Ethical epistemology
Ethics
General subjects
History and sciences of religions
Logic
Logical proofs
Logical theorems
Metaphysics
Modal logic
Omniscience
Parody
Philosophy
Philosophy of religion
Religion
Religious studies
Logics
Philosophy of Religion
Metaphysics
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Summary:Knowledge of philosophy exists only to the extent that there are logics of metaphysics, logics of ethics and logics of epistemology. One thus commits the monologic fallacy by committing oneself to the position that there is only one correct logic. Applications of modal logics to metaphysics in order to prove existence theorems in philosophy of religion are better when done without appeal to KT, K4 or K5. Logical constructivism is akin to constructivist metaphysical theories of mathematical objects in applying Ockham's razor to the logic used to construct existence theorems in metaphysics.
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ISSN:0020-7047
1572-8684
DOI:10.1023/a:1020854101054