Assessing the bioweapons threat

Is there a foundation of agreement among experts about risk? The U.S. government (USG) has taken steps intended to diminish the likelihood of misuse of research—in one recent action, declaring a funding moratorium on gain-of-function studies on influenza until a risk-benefit analysis can be conducte...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inScience (American Association for the Advancement of Science) Vol. 349; no. 6250; pp. 792 - 793
Main Authors Boddie, Crystal, Watson, Matthew, Ackerman, Gary, Gronvall, Gigi Kwik
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Washington The American Association for the Advancement of Science 21.08.2015
Subjects
Assessments
Biological & chemical weapons
Biological weapons
Biomedical research
Funding
Governments
Influenza
National security
Risk analysis
Security
Threat evaluation
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Summary:Is there a foundation of agreement among experts about risk? The U.S. government (USG) has taken steps intended to diminish the likelihood of misuse of research—in one recent action, declaring a funding moratorium on gain-of-function studies on influenza until a risk-benefit analysis can be conducted ( 1 ). The analysis is expected to examine biosafety concerns, the potential for such research to produce a biological weapons agent, and the possibility that publication may lower barriers to bioweapons development ( 1 ). To analyze the security risks of biological research, however, it is first necessary to determine the likelihood that bioweapons will threaten national security and to what degree legitimate research is at risk of misuse. This type of assessment is fraught with uncertainty.
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ISSN:0036-8075
1095-9203
DOI:10.1126/science.aab0713