O problema do cociente partidário na teoria e na prática brasileiras do mandato representativo

• Published in: Dados (Rio de Janeiro) Vol. 42; no. 1; pp. 63 - 110
• Main Author: Tavares, José Antônio Giusti
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 1999
• Subjects: party quota; representative mandate; territorial constituency; voluntary constituency
• ISSN: 0011-5258; 0011-5258; 1678-4588
• DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52581999000100005

The electoral system affects in advance and decisively the nature of representative mandates and the legitimacy of legislative decisions. Majoritarian systems decrease the density of the representative mandate and, when districts are numerically small in terms of both representatives and constituency, such systems tend to curtail the independence of elected officeholders, whose actions can be monitored by the dominant local groups. On the other hand, proportional systems that operate with numerically large districts maximize the density of representative mandates and, at the same time, ensure the elected officeholder the independent responsibility that characterizes the modern representative mandate. There are, however, three varieties of proportional systems (flexible list, open list, and no list) where the vote cast for candidates from different parties or inter-party electoral coalitions eliminate the party quota and jeopardize party identity both inside and outside the legislative realm. In the Brazilian case, this mechanism follows and reinforces the individualistic and atomistic tradition of the political elites