Emergence in Ontic Structural Realism

• Published in: Profil Vol. 24; no. 2; pp. 1 - 17
• Main Author: Dvořák, Petr
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Masaryk University 31.12.2023
• Subjects: emergence; james ladyman; metaphysical structuralism; ontic structural realism; weak emergence
• ISSN: 1212-9097; 1212-9097
• DOI: 10.5817/pf23-2-37364

The paper outlines the understanding of emergence in Ontic Structural Realism of James Ladyman (and his co-author Ross). First, the notion of emergence is explored, surveying the various distinctions associated with it (ontological vs. epistemological, diachronic vs. synchronic, weak vs. strong). It turns out that Ross and Ladyman’s notion of emergence is that of weak epistemological emergence compatible with ontic reduction. Particular notions of emergence are associated with the objection embodied in the Generalized Causal Exclusion Argument. The latter is sketched and the solution of Ross and Ladyman is presented: first, in general, the notion of weak emergence is not threatened by this objection. Causal reduction associated with it ensures that there are no competing causal explanations, so no overdetermination arises. Second, there is a peculiar feature of Ross and Ladyman’s theory; namely, there is no causation on the fundamental level, only pattern dynamism. Causation emerges only on higher levels of special sciences. Hence, there is no problem of causal overdetermination.