Kidnapping and the limits of acceptance

For many humanitarian agencies, acceptance—gaining the trust and protection of local communities—is the preferred security management tool for reasons of perception, ease of access and cost (both real and opportunity costs). Humanitarian agencies have long been uncomfortable with the contradiction o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of international humanitarian action Vol. 2; no. 1
Main Author Cunningham, Andrew J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cham Springer International Publishing 01.12.2017
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Case studies
Climate Change
Cost control
Deterrence
Human Rights
Humanitarianism
International Humanitarian Law
International Relations
Kidnapping
Law
Law and Criminology
Law of Armed Conflict
Migration
Natural Hazards
Security management
Humanitarian security
Acceptance
Kidnapping
AQIM
Nigeria
Carl Schmitt
Syria
Humanitarian agencies
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:For many humanitarian agencies, acceptance—gaining the trust and protection of local communities—is the preferred security management tool for reasons of perception, ease of access and cost (both real and opportunity costs). Humanitarian agencies have long been uncomfortable with the contradiction of using deterrence mechanisms in humanitarian operations, although the increased use of armed guards has been a noticeable trend over the last decade or so. Protection—‘bunkerisation’—has also become the norm in many highly insecure contexts, with similar contradictions and feelings of discomfort associated with this strategy. But in hyper-insecure contexts, is acceptance a viable option? This paper argues that in some contexts, the acceptance strategy no longer works. The primary cause of this is the increasing severity of the kidnapping risk which has overwhelmed the usefulness of ‘normal’, non-deterrence and non-protection-oriented security measures such as acceptance. The dangers of relying on deterrence measures for humanitarian organisations in such sensitive contexts will be reviewed. As a case study, the experience of one particular humanitarian organisation working in northern Nigeria and Syria in the 2012–2014 period is elaborated upon. A ‘zone of exception’ framework is proposed based on the work of Carl Schmitt. Issues for future reflection by organisations working in such contexts are introduced.
ISSN:2364-3412
2364-3404
DOI:10.1186/s41018-017-0020-5