Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions

We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of mechanism and institution design (Online) Vol. 1; no. 1; pp. 1 - 44
Main Authors Ma, Jinpeng, Li, Qiongling
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design 19.12.2016
Subjects
Double auction mechanisms
incremental subgradient methods
network resource allocations
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Summary:We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or crash.
ISSN:2399-844X
2399-8458
DOI:10.22574/jmid.2016.12.001