Extraordinariness and the Two Stages of Rationality

• Published in: Rethinking the Western Understanding of the Self pp. 48 - 58
• Main Author: Steinvorth, Ulrich
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: 22.06.2009
• ISBN: 9780521757072; 9780521762748; 052176274X; 052175707X
• DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139175258.008

The cartesian conception presents the self as the capacity of an individual to freely choose the reasons for always fallible judgments that is necessarily embodied and identified by an organism but not identical with it. Descartes has been most important for the development of this conception, but is neither an infallible authority nor the only contributor. In this section I'll look at authors who prepared and confirmed the conception: Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Freud, and Hannah Arendt. They will clarify what is not yet clear enough: By our selfs, we necessarily aim at extraordinariness.Plato distinguishes three parts of the mind. To reason and desire, two parts long ago distinguished under various names, he adds thumos, which we may translate as “passion” or “spirit.” According to Plato, reason and desire propose to us actions that are often opposed to each other. Reason is a faculty enabling us to know nonempirical ideas that inspire action; desire is what pushes or pulls us to pleasure satisfaction. This distinction corresponds to my distinction of self and subject, because Plato's reason also is the power of judgment and his desire is something that happens to us. Plato regards desire's power to move us to action as stronger than that of reason. But reason in its fight with desire is helped by thumos. Thumos appears not only in adults but in children and dogs. They may passionately fight for a cause, also for reason, even though they are not themselves attacked.