Signaling mechanism of corporate payout policy: A case of Indian firms

• Published in: Accounting (North Vancouver) Vol. 2; no. 2; pp. 53 - 66
• Main Authors: Anwar, Sadaf, Singh, Shveta, Jain, P. K.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Growing Science 01.11.2017
• Subjects: Event Study Cash Dividends; India; Share Repurchases; Signaling
• ISSN: 2369-7393; 2369-7407
• DOI: 10.5267/j.ac.2016.1.004

Historically, cash dividends are the most important form of payout policy; however, they have been losing popularity relative to share repurchases. This paper examines the signaling effect of the payout decisions namely, cash dividends and share repurchases by BSE 500 index companies. It attempts to uncover the underlying forces behind the firm’s choices of payout policy in the Indian context. Using the standard ‘Event Standard Methodology’, a strong case of positive signaling is reported in case of repurchase announcements vis-a-vis cash dividend announcements. It is observed that cash dividends are not perceived by investors as positive signals as they prefer their earnings to be retained by the companies for growth prospects. In case of share repurchases, the existence of undervaluation, signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses is reported, consistent with the fact the share repurchases are welcomed by the Indian companies. The results would provide insights into the economics of the choice between cash dividends versus share repurchases as payout mechanism adopted by the sample companies. The findings would also be useful to the academia as well as industry in understanding the payout practice and the extent to which the Indian managers use the assumptions, models and decision rules regarding payout.