Democracy and Political Scepticism: Comment on Bufacchi

The claim that democracy requires a particular type of political scepticism for its justification has an initial plausibility. The present article argues, however, that Bufacchi does not succeed in adequately identifying the relevant type of uncertainty. Secondly, it is claimed here that Bufacchi�...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPolitics (Manchester, England) Vol. 23; no. 2; pp. 141 - 144
Main Author Hyland, James (Eddie)
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK and Malden, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 01.05.2003
SAGE Publications
Subjects
Autonomy
Democracy
Ethics
Rawls, John
Skepticism (Doctrine)
Theoretical Problems
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:The claim that democracy requires a particular type of political scepticism for its justification has an initial plausibility. The present article argues, however, that Bufacchi does not succeed in adequately identifying the relevant type of uncertainty. Secondly, it is claimed here that Bufacchi's analysis neglects a crucial element in the justification of democracy, namely, the positive evaluation of moral autonomy. When the role of autonomy is given its proper place epistemology becomes secondary, providing a basis not for scepticism but for a theory such as Rawls's theory of reasonable disagreement.
Bibliography:istex:76944795B6563AE10FA6AE17281421FFF14C5142
ArticleID:PONL190
ark:/67375/WNG-7FHGSBXJ-N
ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0263-3957
1467-9256
DOI:10.1111/1467-9256.00190