Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Democratization of Moral Virtue

Abstract This paper examines Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s moral philosophy, focusing on her accounts of virtuous conduct, conscience, obligation, and moral character. I argue that Cockburn’s account of virtue has two interlocking parts: a view of what virtue requires of us, and a view of how we come...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inCanadian journal of philosophy Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 83 - 97
Main Author Lustila, Getty L.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Edmonton Cambridge University Press 01.01.2020
Subjects
17th century
18th century
Democratization
Ethics
Happiness
Interconnections
Locke, John (1632-1704)
Morality
Natural law
Naturalism
Pain
Philosophy
Sanctions
Writers
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Summary:Abstract This paper examines Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s moral philosophy, focusing on her accounts of virtuous conduct, conscience, obligation, and moral character. I argue that Cockburn’s account of virtue has two interlocking parts: a view of what virtue requires of us, and a view of how we come to see this requirement as authoritative. I then argue that while the two parts are ultimately in tension with one another, the tension is instructive. I use Cockburn’s encounter with Shaftesbury’s writings to help bring out this tension in her thought. I conclude that Cockburn’s work marks a bridge in modern moral philosophy from seventeenth-century natural law theory to the naturalism of the eighteenth century— that of Gay, Hume, and Bentham.
ISSN:0045-5091
1911-0820
DOI:10.1017/can.2019.9