The Lives of Others

Abstract On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in rec...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inProceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 97; no. 1; pp. 104 - 121
Main Author Farkas, Katalin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published UK Oxford University Press 04.06.2023
Subjects
Meditation
Sensory perception
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Summary:Abstract On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.
ISSN:0309-7013
0066-7374
1467-8349
1467-9264
DOI:10.1093/arisup/akad009