A novel physical layer authentication mechanism for static and mobile 3D underwater acoustic communication networks

In this paper, we present an innovative physical layer authentication approach for underwater acoustic communication networks. Our method leverages the transmitter nodes’ positions to establish a robust authentication mechanism. We consider two scenarios based on the mobility of the nodes. In the fi...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPhysical communication Vol. 66; p. 102430
Main Authors Aman, Waqas, Al-Kuwari, Saif, Qaraqe, Marwa
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.10.2024
Subjects
Impersonation
Localization
Location
Mobility
Physical layer authentication
Position
Security
Spoofing
Underwater acoustic communication
Impersonation
Position
Underwater acoustic communication
Mobility
Spoofing
Physical layer authentication
Security
Localization
Location
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:In this paper, we present an innovative physical layer authentication approach for underwater acoustic communication networks. Our method leverages the transmitter nodes’ positions to establish a robust authentication mechanism. We consider two scenarios based on the mobility of the nodes. In the first scenario, underwater nodes (both legitimate and malicious) are static, while the second scenario assumes that the underwater nodes are mobile moving at a certain velocity. For both scenarios, we estimate position by analyzing the signals received at reference nodes that are strategically placed within a predetermined underwater area. Once the estimates are available, we propose binary hypothesis testing based on the estimated position to determine the legitimacy of the transmitter node. Furthermore, when the nodes are mobile, we perform velocity estimation at a certain time by taking the difference of the estimated coordinates, for which we also find the uncertainty in the estimation. We use a linear Kalman filter operation to track the legitimate node’s mobility. We provide closed-form expressions of the false alarm rate and missed detection rate resulting from binary hypothesis testing. We validate our proposed mechanism through simulation, demonstrating error behavior against link quality, malicious node location, and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.
ISSN:1874-4907
DOI:10.1016/j.phycom.2024.102430