The Context Principle and Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Types

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 98; no. 3; pp. 401 - 414
Main Author Ruffino, Marco Antonio
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.03.1994
Springer
D. Reidel Pub. Co., etc
Subjects
20th century
Ambiguity
Existence
Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas)
Logical empiricism
Logical form
Mathematical functions
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophical object
Philosophy
Symbolism
Symbols
Syntactic theory
Type theory
Symbolism
Wittgenstein (L.)
Russell (B.)
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Summary:In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/BF01063927