Stable Bank Cooperation for Cost Reduction Problem

In the paper we consider a problem of bank cost reduction by joint usage of ATMs. In coalition case, we assume that cooperation may be naturally restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Statements about t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAUCO Czech Economic Review Vol. 8; no. 1; pp. 7 - 25
Main Authors Parilina, Elena, Sedakov, Artem
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Prague Univerzita Karlova v Praze - Institut ekonomických studií 2014
Charles University in Prague - Institute of Economic Studies
Czech Economic Review
Subjects
ATM
Automated teller machines
Cooperation
Cost reduction
Economy
Game theory
State banks
Studies
Technology adoption
Coalition structure
Shapley value
cost allocation problem
stability
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Summary:In the paper we consider a problem of bank cost reduction by joint usage of ATMs. In coalition case, we assume that cooperation may be naturally restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Statements about the configuration of stable coalition structures are proposed. We also consider special cases in which their existence is proved.
ISSN:1802-4696
1805-9406