Original Sin, the Fall, and Epistemic Self-Trust

In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone en...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTheologica (Louvain-la-Neuve) Vol. 2; no. 1; pp. 84 - 94
Main Author Rutledge, Jonathan C.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
German
Published Catholic University of Louvain 27.03.2018
Subjects
Analytic Theology
Effects of Sin
Epistemic Self-trust
Original Sin
the Fall
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Summary:In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.
ISSN:2593-0265
2593-0265
DOI:10.14428/thl.v0i0.1303