Security metrics and tradeoff of cyber-physical systems subject to false data injection attacks

This paper focuses on the vulnerable and stealthy regions of the intricate cyber attackers pertaining to state-of-the-art cyber-physical systems from the perspective of control-theoretic metrics. Using the minimum-energy attack signals and the L 2 -gain of output signals as vulnerability and stealth...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in3rd International Conference on Control Theory and Applications (ICoCTA 2023) Vol. 2023; pp. 141 - 145
Main Authors Zhu, S., Chen, J.
Format Conference Proceeding
LanguageEnglish
Published The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2023
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Summary:This paper focuses on the vulnerable and stealthy regions of the intricate cyber attackers pertaining to state-of-the-art cyber-physical systems from the perspective of control-theoretic metrics. Using the minimum-energy attack signals and the L 2 -gain of output signals as vulnerability and stealthiness, respectively, these two predominant concerns of attackers and the corresponding vulnerable subspaces and stealthy subspaces are interpreted by the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of controllability Gramian matrix and observability Gramian matrix. It is also shown that the principal angles of these two subspaces indicate the tradeoff between the vulnerability and stealthiness of subspaces. A model of moving vehicles validates the effectiveness of theoretical results.
DOI:10.1049/icp.2023.3010