Imagination as a meta-subject in the methodology of a thought experiment
Introduction. The paper claims that each thought experiment, despite of its particular subject, reveals the general principles of the work of the imagination – these are elements of the transcendental scheme, which I. Kant controversially defines as pure representation, that is both intellectual and...
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Published in | Izvestiâ Saratovskogo universiteta. Novaâ seriâ. Seriâ Filosofiâ. Psihologiâ. Pedagogika (Online) Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 368 - 372 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Saratov State University
18.12.2024
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Introduction. The paper claims that each thought experiment, despite of its particular subject, reveals the general principles of the
work of the imagination – these are elements of the transcendental scheme, which I. Kant controversially defines as pure representation, that
is both intellectual and sensory. In this sense, imagination is the meta-subject of a thought experiment. Theoretical analysis. With the help of
thought experiments operating marginal subjects, the necessary synthesis schemes related to fundamental concepts are clarified. The connection
between a thought experiment and imagination is obvious and is considered trivial – as R. Sorensen notes, in a thought experiment «imagination
substitutes for perception» and the reliability of the result depends on how well imagination «can fill a role originally intended for perception». At
the same time, the ambiguity in the interpretation of imagination, characteristic for the intellectual culture of modern times, is directly reflected
in the assessment of the epistemological status of a thought experiment closely associated with it. Imagination is understood, on the one hand, as
something opposite to reason – the source of chimeras and delusions; on the other hand, imagination is a fundamental condition for cognition, since outside the synthesis, from which any subject of knowledge begins, cognitive activity is generally impossible, and “to know” means
“to be able to visualise”, i.e. to imagine. The structure of this ability precisely reveals a thought experiment in which non-realistic premises
are used to demonstrate the work of transcendental schematism, i.e. the necessary method of synthesis - just as a map reflects not only the
terrain (which might not exist), but also the cartographer’s way of making his job (which will necessarily be depicted). Conclusion. In addition
to the subject, which is the obvious goal of a specific thought experiment, it reveals a subject that is invariant for all thought experiments – the
principles of the imagination. |
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ISSN: | 1819-7671 2542-1948 |
DOI: | 10.18500/1819-7671-2024-24-4-368-372 |