Scientific Argumentation and Social Compromises: The Difficulty of Codifying Occupational Diseases in France

Policy choices are often regarded as compromises between public authorities and interest groups, even when the use of experts is required because of their technical nature. In this article, it is shown that expertise cannot be considered as a 'passive' resource in the hands of interest gro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inFrench politics Vol. 2; no. 3; pp. 272 - 297
Main Author Deplaude, Marc-Olivier
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London Palgrave Macmillan 01.12.2004
Subjects
Diseases
Employers' organizations
Experts
France
Health Policy
Humanities and Social Sciences
Interest Groups
Labor Relations
Medicine
Occupational diseases
Occupational health
Occupational Safety and Health
Policy Making
Political science
Political theory
Sociology
Trade unions
France
advisory committees
expertise
interest groups
occupational diseases
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Summary:Policy choices are often regarded as compromises between public authorities and interest groups, even when the use of experts is required because of their technical nature. In this article, it is shown that expertise cannot be considered as a 'passive' resource in the hands of interest groups, but as a relatively autonomous field with specific rules that impacts policy outcomes. Thus, the convergence of positions between some experts and some interest groups needs investigation and explanation. This contention is illustrated through the analysis of the codification of occupational diseases in France. This process involves a deep medical expertise and has sparked a very intense controversy between labour unions and employers' organizations. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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ISSN:1476-3419
1476-3427
DOI:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200064