Lessons Learned from a Multiple Casualty Blast Incident

Introduction: On February 24, 2021, a large explosion and fire occurred in an industrial estate in Singapore. Eight casualties with major burns were conveyed to the emergency department (ED) at Singapore General Hospital, the designated regional Burns Centre. This article details the events and reco...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPrehospital and disaster medicine Vol. 38; no. S1; p. s171
Main Authors Juan, Li, Quah, Joy, Ho, Shu Fang, Ng, Ming Wei, Chan, Wei Xin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.05.2023
Jems Publishing Company, Inc
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Summary:Introduction: On February 24, 2021, a large explosion and fire occurred in an industrial estate in Singapore. Eight casualties with major burns were conveyed to the emergency department (ED) at Singapore General Hospital, the designated regional Burns Centre. This article details the events and recommendations arising from this multiple casualty incident. Method: An After-Action Review (AAR) was conducted to examine the prehospital notification process, casualty triage & tagging, medical management, manpower and resource allocation, and command-and-control structure. Results: All eight casualties were conveyed by the national Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and arrived within a 46-minute window. The first three suffered 90% full-thickness burns and inhalational injuries and were intubated. The remaining five suffered between 37% to 64% burns, with three requiring intubations as well. Four major areas were identified for improvement: Firstly, there was scant information from EMS regarding total casualty count. There was also inadequate knowledge of mass burns triage protocols in the ED. Thus, resources were heavily utilized for the first three casualties - all of whom were later deemed unsalvageable, given palliative care and demised. Secondly, casualty identities were initially unknown. They were tagged with similar-looking ten-digit serial numbers, resulting in a near-miss event involving mislabelled blood tubes. Thirdly, there was unfamiliarity with the incident response plan for a multiple casualty incident of this scale. This contributed to lack of situational oversight and inconsistent leadership direction from various stakeholders with resulting conflicting instructions. Fourthly, routine trauma computed tomography pan-scans for all casualties caused delayed reporting by Radiology and created a bottleneck in casualty disposition. A multi-disciplinary workgroup comprising Emergency, Trauma, Burns and Intensive Care departments outlined several recommendations based on the AAR findings. Drills were strongly recommended to resume following a hiatus due to COVID-19. Conclusion: AARs help provide invaluable insights. Response plans should be refined together with relevant stakeholders.
ISSN:1049-023X
1945-1938
DOI:10.1017/S1049023X23004442