Token‐based reviewer economies: Proposed institutions for managing the reviewer shortage problem

Abstract This opinion paper presents two proposed token‐based systems to fix the information system academy's review system. At present, the review system consumes more human resources than the information systems academy has by an order of magnitude. The cost of this overflow is borne entirely...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInformation systems journal (Oxford, England)
Main Author Chua, Cecil Eng Huang
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 07.09.2024
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Summary:Abstract This opinion paper presents two proposed token‐based systems to fix the information system academy's review system. At present, the review system consumes more human resources than the information systems academy has by an order of magnitude. The cost of this overflow is borne entirely by information systems researchers. I argue this is because the review system is based on a gift economy that cannot handle the currently sized market. Both proposals involve the creation of tokens and a central governing body. The first proposal involves a market built around a review bank (central governing body) that issues review tokens that function as a proxy currency. Journals function as intermediaries between authors and reviewers. Authors pay journals for reviews, and journals pay experts such as reviewers and editors for their services. Reviewers exchange their review tokens on the open market or trade review tokens for favours with institutions like universities. The second proposal involves a gift economy where reviewers transfer their allegiance from peers to the information systems academy. In this proposal, each individual token is unique, like a trading card and an affiliation board tracks the transfer of tokens, linking former possessors of a token together in a review ring. As tokens are regifted, they accumulate history, and thereby social worth, captured in the form of messages each possessor writes. Former possession of a large number of tokens and of tokens with particular histories confers status benefits. These benefits in turn lock reviewers into the review ring system encouraging them to do further reviews. Economic, social, and other implications of both policies are discussed and questions are posed for the information systems academy to grapple with. Example issues discussed include the effect of the proposals on the political power of reviewers and shifts in political power in the information systems academy.
ISSN:1350-1917
1365-2575
DOI:10.1111/isj.12560